process called apoptosis. Dendritic cells (DCs) are sensitive to both signal types and have the ability 3 to stimulate or suppress the adaptive immune system. DCs are the intrusion detection agents of the 4 human immune system, policing the tissue for potential sources of damage in the form of signals and 5 for potential culprits responsible for the damage in the form of 'antigen'. Antigens are proteins which 6 can be 'presented' to the adaptive immune system by DCs, and can belong to pathogens or to the host 7 itself. 8
The DCA incorporates danger-based DC biology to form an algorithm that is both truly bio-inspired 9
and is capable of performing anomaly detection. It is a population based algorithm, where multiple 10
DCs are programmed to process signals and antigen. 'Signals' are mapped to context information, such 11
as the behaviour of a monitored, e.g. CPU usage or network traffic statistics. 'Antigens' are mapped 12 as potential causes for the changes in behaviour, e.g. the system calls of a running program. The DCA 13
correlates the antigen and signal information across the population of cells to produce a consensus 14 coefficient value which is assessed to determine anomalous antigen.
15
The DCA has been successfully applied to a subset of intrusion detection problems, focussing on port 16 scan detection. Port scans are used to establish network layout and to uncover vulnerable computers.
17
The detection of the scanning phase of an attack can be highly beneficial, as upon its detection the 18 level of security can be increased across a network in response. The DCA has been applied to both 19 ping scans and SYN scans in realtime and offline [27] [25]. The algorithm produced high rates of true 20 positives and low rates of false positives.
21
While the performance of the DCA on these problems appears to be good, thus far no direct 22
comparison has been performed with another system on the same port scan data. The need for a 23 rigorous comparison is necessary to truly demonstrate the capabilities of this algorithm. The signal 24 processing component housed within the DCA bears some resemblance to the function of a neural 25 network [13] . Given these superficial similarities, the obvious next-step for the development of the DCA 26 is to compare its performance to that of a neural network based system, such as a Self-Organizing Map 27 (SOM) [47] . 28 SOM is a clustering method of unsupervised learning where high dimensional data is mapped to 29 a lower dimensional space to create a feature map. This map is constructed from training data and 30
consists of a series of interconnected nodes. Upon the analysis of the test data, the incoming data items 31 are matched against nodes in the map with similar characteristics. SOM uses a similar process to a 32 single-layer neural network to generate the map, and a simple distance metric is used to match the 33 incoming test data to the most appropriate node. This technique can be used for anomaly detection 34 as the training data can consist of normal data items, with unclustered data representing a potential 35
anomaly. SOM is an excellent choice for comparison as it has a history of application within computer 36 security and can be manipulated to use similar input data as used with the DCA. 37
The aim of this paper is to compare the DCA with a SOM. To achieve this aim the two algorithms 38 are applied to the detection of an outbound SYN-based port scan using data captured from previous 39 real-time experiments performed with the DCA [25] . The results of this comparison indicate that the 40 DCA and SOM are both equally as effective at detecting SYN based port scans, and appear to make 41 similar false positive errors. As a baseline a k-means clustering algorithm is applied to the signals in 42 isolation.
43
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the relevant background and context information 44
is given regarding problems in computer security and how these problems relate to port scanning in 45 addition to a summary of current port scanning techniques. In Sections 3 and 4, descriptions are given 46 of the DCA and SOM respectively, including details of their implementations. In Section 5, the two 47 approaches are compared experimentally. In Section 6 we perform an analysis and comparison between 48 the two systems based on the obtained results and debate their differences and similarities, further 49 validated by a baseline series. In the final sections we discuss the results of these comparisons and 50 present the implications for the future of the DCA. 51 52 53
2 Related Work 54 55 2.1 Overview 56 57 As this paper encompasses a variety of techniques and concepts, this section is subdivided into three 58 parts. Firstly, the problems associated with port scans are described followed by a description of current 3 1 2 scan detection techniques. This is followed by the related computer security work in AIS, including the 3 development of the DCA and the motivation for its development. This section continues with a brief 4 overview of the use of various SOM algorithms in computer security. Insider attacks are one of the most costly and dangerous attacks performed against computerised 13 systems, with a large amount of known intrusions of intrusions attributed to internal attackers [6] .
14 This type of intrusion is defined through the attacker being a legitimate user of a system who behaves 15 in an unauthorised manner. Such insider attacks have the potential to cause major disruption given 16 that a large number of networks do not employ internal firewalling with many security countermeasures 17 focussing on the detection of external intruders. Insiders frequently know and have access to network 18 topology information. As insiders operate from within an organisation, this provides them with scope 19 to abuse a weak link in the security chain, namely the end users. Having knowledge and relationships 20 with other network users brings with it the potential to coerce passwords from legitimate users for 21 the purpose of gaining access across multiple machines on a network. This information can be used to 22 steal sensitive data, to cause damage to the network or to disguise the identity of the true attacker.
23
Such attacks frequently involve multiple stages. The initial stage is the information gathering stage, It is wise for an attacker to understand the network in question, to avoid wasting time trying to 31 exploit machines which are not receptive to an attack. It is pointless attempting to attack a host which 32 is no longer connected to the network! While scanners are not an 'intrusion' in the classical sense, they 33 are often a pre-cursor to an actual attack, and evidence of sufficient scanning across a network can 34 suggest that an attack may soon follow [39] .
35
A port is a specific endpoint on a network, which is a virtual address as part of a virtual circuit. It is 36 important to note that a port in this context is an abstract concept, not to be confused with a physical 37 port such as a serial port. Ports allow for the direct exchange of information between two hosts. It is 38 similar to a telephone number and is more specific than an IP address as it provides a direct connection 39 between two endpoints. Probing a port with a packet leads to information on the state of the port and 40 its host. Ports can be in three states if the scanned host is available, namely open, closed or filtered.
41
Port scanning tools such as nmap [17] can be used to send packets to various ports on remote hosts to 42 gain understanding regarding the status of the scanned host. The type of packet used to perform such 43 probes can be one of a number of types, including Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) ping, 44 TCP, and UDP. According to Bailey-Lee et al. [4] , TCP SYN scans are the most commonly observed 45 scan, accounting for over half of all scans performed.
46
Additionally the scans themselves can be performed in a number of different ways, varying the 47 number of hosts scanned, the number of ports scanned, the IP address of the sender and the rate 48 at which packets are sent. where it is combined with a network based approach and is used to identify potentially malicious 11 remote hosts in addition to detecting scanning activity.
12
In our previous research, the DCA is applied to the detection of various port scans. The DCA is 13 implemented as a host based system monitor, detecting the performance of an outbound port scan, in 14 attempt overcome some of the problems with using static time windows. Initially the DCA is applied to 15 the detection of simple ICMP ping scans [29] , where the algorithm was used in real-time and produced 16 high rates of true positives and low rates of false positives.
17
In addition, DCA is used in the detection of a standard SYN scans, also in a real-time environ-18 ment [27] . The results of this study show that the DCA shows promise as a successful port scan 19 detector. However the results presented were preliminary and as the experiments were performed 'live' 20 in real-time, certain sensitivity could not be performed. Therefore, it is necessary to take this investi-21 gation further and explore this application with more rigour. The experiments described in this paper 22
are extension experiments from the SYN scan data used in Greensmith with a computer immune system [18] . The research of AIS in security has extended past the detection 34 of viruses and has focussed on network intrusion detection [45] .
35
The AIS algorithms used in security are generally based on the principles of "self-nonself discrimi-36 nation". This is an immunological concept that the body has the ability to discriminate between self 37 and nonself (i.e. foreign) protein molecules, termed antigen. The natural mechanism by which the body 38 learns this discrimination is termed negative selection. In this process, self-reactive immune cells are 39 deleted during a 'training period' in embryonic development and infancy. This results in a tuned popu-40 lation of cells, poised to react against any threat which is deemed nonself. These principles are used to 41 underpin the supervised negative selection algorithm. Negative selection itself is described eloquently 42 in a number of sources including the work of Hofmeyr and Forrest [32] can be attributed to its biological naivety. It is recognised that the negative selection algorithm is 7
based on a naive model of central tolerance developed in the 1950s [12] . 8
Aickelin et al. propose that through close collaboration with immunologists, computer scientists 9 will be able to develop more biologically realistic AIS which could potentially overcome the problems 10 of false positives and scaling observed with negative selection [1] . The DCA is developed using this 11 interdisciplinary approach [26] , drawing inspiration from DCs as it is now widely accepted that these 12 cells are a major control unit in the human immune system. The signal processing used to transform the input to interim output signals is shown in Figure 3 , 54 with the implications of each output signal given in Table 1 . Costimulatory molecule (CSM) signal is and therefore tighter coupling is given to the signal and antigen data. This effect is explored in more 27 detail in Oates et al. [58] where a theoretical analysis is provided. 
21

54
We suggest that the updates of antigen, signals and cells are performed independently, based on 55 previous experience with this algorithm. This is represented in Figure 4 . implementation has a client/server architecture which separates data collection using clients, from data 49 processing on a server, as shown in Figure 5 .
50
Input data is processed using libtissue clients, which transform raw data into antigen and signals.
51
Algorithms can be implemented within the libtissue server, as it provides all the required components 52 such as the ability to define different cell types, specifying receptors, compartments and internal signals. type. An overview of this is given in Figure 6 . Table 2 . Various properties of the brain were used as an inspiration for a large set of algorithms and compu-7 tational theories known as neural networks. Such algorithms have shown to be successful, however a 8 vital aspect of biological neural networks was omitted in the algorithm's development. This was the 9 notion of self-organization and spatial organization of information within the brain. In 1981 Kohonen 10 proposed a method which takes into account these two biological properties and presented them in his
The SOM algorithm generates, usually, two dimensional maps representing a scaled version of 13 n-dimensional data used as the input to the algorithm. These maps can be thought of as "neural 14 networks" in the same sense as SOM's traditional rivals, artificial neural networks (ANNs). This is 15 due to the algorithm's inspiration from the way that mammalian brains are structured and operate 16 in a data reducing and self-organised fashion. Traditional ANNs originated from the functionality and 17 interoperability of neurons within the brain. The SOM algorithm on the other hand was inspired by 18 the existence of many kinds of "maps" within the brain that represent spatially organised responses. As the algorithm represents the above described functionality, it contains numerous methods that 35 achieve properties similar to the biological system. The SOM algorithm comprises of competitive 36 learning, self-organization, multidimensional scaling, global and local ordering of the generated map 37 and its adaptation. 38 There are two high-level stages of the algorithm that ensure a successful creation of a map. The 39 first stage is the global ordering stage in which we start with a map of predefined size with neurons 40 of random nature and using competitive learning and a method of self-organization, the algorithm 41 produces a rough estimation of the topography of the map based on the input data. Once a desired 42 number of input data is used for such estimation, the algorithm proceeds to the fine-tuning stage, 43 where the effect of the input data on the topography of the map is monotonically decreasing with 44 time, while individual neurons and their close topological neighbours are sensitised and thus fine tuned 45 to the present input. Adaptation is the step where the winning node is adjusted to be slightly more similar to the input x.
38
This is achieved by using a kernel function, such as the Gaussian function (h ci ) as seen in Equation 4
39 as part of a learning process. 
43
In the above function, α(t) denotes a "learning-rate factor" and σ(t) denotes the width of the 44 neighbourhood affected by the Gaussian function. Both of these parameters decrease monotonically 45 over time (t). He states that the number of steps should be at least 500 times the number of map units. For this 7 reason 100,000 epochs were used in our experiments. Another possible mechanism for the termination 8 of the algorithm is the calculation of the quantization error, which is the mean of ||x − w c || over the 9 training data. Once the overall quantization error falls below a certain threshold, the execution of 10 the algorithm can stop as an acceptable lower dimensional representation of the input data has been 11 generated.
18
For the experiments in this paper, two data sets are compiled, collected using a system of signal 19 collection scripts with raw input signal data collected from the Linux /proc filesystem. One data set 20 is termed passive normal (PN) and contains a SYN scan performed without normal processes invoked 21 by a user i.e. scan and shell processes. The second data set is termed active normal (AN). This data 22 set contains an identical SYN scan but is combined with simultaneous instances of normal programs 23 which are used actively by a user throughout the duration of the session i.e. scan, shell processes and 25 a firefox web browser. 
34
The AN data set is 7,000 seconds in duration, with 'normal' antigen generated by running a web 
42
The PN data set is also 7,000 seconds in duration and comprises of a SYN scan and its pseudo- Figures 7, 8 and 9 for the AN data set and in Figure 10 , 11 and 12 for the 6 PN data set. 7
To devise a set of appropriate signals a number of preliminary experiments must be performed, 8 in addition to the acquisition of knowledge regarding the effects of scanning and normal networking 9 usage within a host. Initially a plethora of system variables are monitored under a variety of situations.
10
The signals used in this experiment are network based attributes. This kind of system data appears 11 to be the most variable under scanning conditions. Once the candidate signals are selected, they are 12 then categorised using the general principles of signal selection i. Scanning IP addresses attached to hosts which are firewalled against ICMP packets generate these error 17 messages in response to probing. This signal is shown to be useful in detecting ping scans and may also 18 be important for the detection of SYN scans, as an initial ping scan is performed to find running hosts.
19
In this experiment, the number of ICMP messages generated is significantly less than observed with a 20 ping scan. To account for this, normalisation of this signal includes multiplying the raw signal value 21 by five, capped at a value of 100 (equivalent to 20 DU errors per second). This process is represented 22
in Equation 6 where raw is the unmodified system data and signal represents the normalised output 23 signal. These terms apply to all equations described within this section. 
32
This normalisation process is shown in Equation 7
.
35 DS-1, the first danger signal is derived from the number of network packets sent per second.
36
Previous experiments with this signal data indicate that it is useful for the detection of outbound 37 scans [27] . A different approach is taken for the normalisation of this signal. A sigmoid function is 38 used to emphasise the differences in observed rate, making the range of 100 to 700 packets per second 39 more sensitive. This sensitive range is determined through preliminary data analysis of host behaviour 40 during scans and normal use, with 750 packets per second found to be the median value across the 41 plethora of preliminary data. This function makes the system less sensitive to fluctuations under 100 42 packets per second, whilst keeping the sensitivity of the higher values. A cap is set at 1500 packets Table 3 . Preliminary 27 experiments have also shown that a moving average is needed to increase the sensitivity of this signal.
28
This average is created over a 60 second period.
29
The inflammatory signal is binary and based on the presence of remote root logins. If a root log-in 
26
Fig . 13 The frequency of system calls invoked by the nmap scan process for the AN data set. The trendline 27 represents a moving average over 100 data points. As this figure is presented on a logarithmic scale, the absence
28
of points indicates a frequency of zero system calls for that particular second.
30
Using multiple system calls with identical PIDs allows for the aggregate antigen sampling method, 31 having multiple antigen per antigen type. This allows for the detection of active processes when changes 32
in signal values are observed. This technique is a form of process anomaly detection, but the actual 33 structure of the PID is not important in terms of its classification, i.e. no pattern matching is performed, 34 on the actual value of the PIDs: it is a label for the purpose of process identification.
35
A graph of the frequency of system calls invoked per second for the AN data set by the nmap 36 process is shown in Figure 13 and for the firefox process in Figure 14 . In these two figures, individual 37 points represent the frequency of system calls per second, while the trendline represents a moving 38 average over 100 points. Summary statistics of the system call data are given in Table 4 , which are 39 generated across the entire session for both processes.
40
The mean/median frequency of system calls for the nmap process is higher than the firefox process.
41
To assess which process is more variable, the means are divided by the standard deviations, as shown 42 in the summary table. This value is larger in the case of nmap than for firefox. This indicates that 43 relatively, the standard deviation of the firefox process is larger in comparison to the mean than that of 44 the nmap process. The various proportions of input system calls are represented as a chart in Figure 15  45 and shows that the nmap process invokes the majority of system calls in the AN data set. Once the data is collected, it is combined into one data set, which is subsequently used as the input 48 into the SOM algorithm. Input feature vectors are then selected from this data set at random and 49 presented to the map for computation. The training results in a map which can be seen in Figure 16 .
50
In this example, the brighter the colour, the greater the dissimilarity of neighbouring nodes, with 51 the map representing four clusters. This shows one of the maps that was generated throughout our 52 experiments. Ten runs were performed, both for training and detection.
54
Detection 55 56
The SOM algorithm itself cannot perform anomaly detection without any further processing. A mean-57 ingful way has to be devised in order to be able to classify and make a decision whether a data item 58 or a set of items are anomalous. The aim of our experiments was to detect whether a whole process is anomalous or not. Thus a method for process, rather than signal set anomaly detection calculation 29 had to be developed.
30
For informational purposes a simple anomaly detection can be performed on our data by classifying 31 sets of signals only. This can be done by firstly using the calculation in Equation 3, which will determine 32 the winning node within our trained map. We will call this the Best Matching Unit (BMU). Once the 33 BMU is found, the actual Euclidean distance between the currently observed vector of signals and 34 the BMU is calculated. The most trivial anomaly detection is done by choosing a threshold for this 35 dissimilarity. If the currently observed item is too different from the BMU, then it is deemed anomalous.
36
In order to perform process anomaly detection, antigen information has to be correlated with signals 37 from the testing data. As the SOM is trained on signals only, antigens (PIDs) need to be correctly 38 correlated with the right signals in order to be able to link anomalous sets of signals to their respective 39 initiators (processes). Initial correlation is done by synchronizing antigens with signals using timestamp 40 information. Any antigen with timestamp t is assigned a signal set at time t, and for the purpose of 41 synchronisation t is measured in seconds. Once this synchronisation takes place, the signal set -antigen 42 coupling is assessed for its anomaly level using the BMU technique described previously.
43
As explained later in this section, the output antigen from the DCA are 'segmented' into fixed 44 sized sets for analysis. These 'antigen segments' consist of a specified number of output antigen used 45 to form the MCAV values. Multiple MCAV values are produced as a result of this procedure, which 46 may add additional sensitivity. To get a more meaningful and easily comparable results to the DCA, a segmentation post-processing needs to be employed. This is achieved by selecting a segment size z which 48 generates the same number of segments as the DCA. The reason behind the differing segment sizes is 49 the way that synchronisation of signal and antigen is achieved in the SOM experiments compared to 50 the way it is achieved by the DCA. The DCA correlates antigen and signal as part of the algorithm's 51 operation whereas the signal and antigen need to be manually correlated at a pre-processing stage 52 before analysis using the SOM can occur. In our case z = 1,800; 18,000; 180,000 and 1,800,000. These 53 segment sizes produce the same number of segments as segment sizes of 100; 1,000; 10,000 and 100,000 54 respectively, used by the DCA.
55
Further post-processing is done by using a binary discrimination of how anomalous a signal set - Both the AN and PN data sets are used in this series. Each data set is collected using a real-time 33 version of the DCA, which also provides the opportunity to verify the detection rate results before an 
50
Higher values of MCAV are expected for the SYN scan process and its parent process the ssh demon, 51 than for the firefox browser. It is expected that smaller values of z will yield an improvement in the 52 precision and accuracy of the detection, though when z = 100, the system may be too sensitive and 53 an element of tolerance to false positives could be lost. The variants of z for the DCA are presented in 54 Table 6 . Table 8 SOM parameters, where α is the "learning-rate factor" and t is the current epoch. Table 5 , derived as a result of previous DCA sensitivity analysis [24] . Weights for the signal 33 processing of these data are shown in Table 7 . These weights provide a shorter time-window for the Table 8 and are chosen based on 37 recommended values as proposed by Kohonen [47] .
38
Antigens are generated using system calls, captured through the use of strace and through manip- 
45
The libtissue tcreplay client is used to perform the numerous runs of each data set. It is impor-46 tant to stress that the system is designed to work in real-time, though tcreplay is used to provide reproducibility of results, so a rigorous analysis can be performed. 37 38 antigens are presented for the pts process, as it is inactive at this point. As the trendline is required 50 to clarify the results this indicates that a higher value of z would be preferable to clearly assess the 51 presence of an anomalous process.
52
In Figure 18 , the result of the PN data set are presented where z=1,000. As with the results 53 presented in Figure 17 , an initial spike of a high MCAV is shown, implying that the scan is in its initial 54 stages. While the individual points on this graph are not as dense as in Figure 17 , the additional spikes 55 representing the latter stages of the scan are less in magnitude, though little difference in the initial 56 MCAV for the nmap processes is shown.
57
The results for z=10,000 are plotted in Figure 19 showing lower values for the pts process and a less 58 sustained response to the nmap SYN scan process. Sensitivity is lost when the value of z is increased 
19
The size of the antigen segments (z) is 10,000. This data represents an average MCAV derived from across the 20 ten runs performed. The trendlines represent moving averages per process of interest across ten data points. Tables 9 and 10 , with the maximum MCAVs greatly reduced from 1.0 in previous 32 experiments to 0.19 for the nmap process.
22
33
The AN results produced by the DCA show similar features. Figure 20 shows the results using the 34 smallest antigen segment size of z=100. In contrast to the PN data set, the nmap SYN scan is not 35 invoked until antigen segment 500. As shown on this graph, following the initiation of this scan, the 36 MCAV of all three processes of interest (nmap, pts, firefox) are shown to increase.
37
These increases in MCAV form four spikes throughout the session duration. The density of the 38 datapoints in this graph makes the correct interpretation of this graph somewhat difficult. This is 39 improved with the addition of a trendline, generated through applying a moving average of 50 points 40 across the data. During the scan period, the DCA presents antigen, irrespective of its source, in the 41 mature context, as shown through the generation of high MCAV values for both the nmap SYN scan 42 and firefox browser processes. This implies that the generation of false positives occurs when a normal 43 and anomalous process run simultaneously through the monitored ssh demon.
44
The results for antigen segments 0 to 500 are shown in Figure 21 for the sake of clarity. During 45 this period the majority of antigen presented belong to the firefox process and some modulation of 46 the behaviour of the monitored system occurs, as seen in the initial 500 seconds of Figure 20 . Despite 47 these activities, the MCAVs presented in Figure 21 are all relatively low. This suggests that the DCA 48 using these particular signals responds appropriately to normal processes in the absence of scanning 49 activity.
50
In Figure 22 , the results are presented for the AN data set where z=1,000. In comparison to 51 Figure 20 , the trendlines of the graph are observably similar. Figure 23 shows that an antigen segment 52 size of z=10,000 produces observably different results to z=1,000. This is evident as the major spike 53 peak evident in Figure 20 and 22 is missing in Figure 23 . Additionally, the only process technically 54 classed as 'anomalous' (MCAV above 0.5, chosen to reflect the proportion of nmap antigen in the input 55 data) is the nmap scan, though only briefly. This implies that the larger size of z increases the rate of 56 false negatives as shown through the lower values in Figure 23 and also shown in Tables 9 and 10 . For 57 experiments where z = 100,000 and z=1,000,000, the MCAVs are also reduced. However, an interesting 58 effect is that there is a greater difference in the MCAVs of the normal and anomalous processes. 
40 41
An example of this is evident in antigen segment zero presented in Table 9 , where the MCAV for Table 10 . This implies that while larger values of z can produce false negatives, the 46 potential for the reduction of false positives is also evident. Table 11 where z is 1,800,000. In a similar manner, the AN results for the SOM produce initially high coefficients for the nmap 46 process. The results for z=1,800 are presented in Figure 27 . This shows a major spike at the point 47 of the scan commencement (segments 400-700). Unlike the DCA upon application of a trendline, it 48 appears that the response to the scan is not sustained as three peaks are evident, as opposed to 49 the single peak shown with the DCA. Also, the SOM produces high coefficient values for the firefox 50 process, suggesting that discrimination between active anomalous and active normal processes can not 51 be completely achieved by either algorithm. 52 53
The graphs produced for z=18,000 and 180,000 are shown in Figures 28 and 29 respectively. As 54 with the PN results, the response to the nmap decreases as the value of z increases. This is evident 55 from both graphs and in Table 11 . Unlike the DCA, which produced MCAVs for nmap which are 
38
This data represents an average MBMU derived from across the ten runs performed. The trendlines represent 39 moving averages per process of interest across 20 data points. Figure 20 with the other antigen segment sizes. The results of Table 13 . These results show that the modification of 49 z produces a statistically significant effect on the resultant anomaly values. Therefore, null hypothesis 50 H1 is also rejected for the SOM in addition to its rejection produced by the DCA. 
41
38
This data represents an average MBMU derived from across the ten runs performed. The trendlines represent 39 moving averages per process of interest across ten data points. 
41
52
The results of this comparison for the firefox process yields a p-value of 0.02, which at the given 53 confidence interval implies that the two sets of results are not statistically significant. This implies 54 that the algorithms produce similar results for active normal processes. For the firefox process, null 55 hypothesis H2 cannot be rejected under these particular circumstances with these given data sets.
56
Upon performance of the same statistical test, the nmap process produces a p-value of 0.002, 57 which shows that the two algorithms produce statistically significant differences in the detection of the 58 scan process. To assess which system produces the better performance, an additional two-sided Mann-24 35 1 2 Whitney is performed. The results of this test show that the DCA has the improved performance, 12 producing a p-value of 0.0001. Therefore null hypothesis H2 can be rejected for the nmap process and 13 that the DCA shows the better performance on this occasion. 14 15 16 6.3 Baseline 17 18
To validate both sets of results and to ensure that both performances are improved over a baseline, 19 a k-means classifier is applied to the signal data. The classifier used belongs to the WEKA suite [65] .
20
In this test 52% of the signals were classed as belonging to one class while 48% to another class. This 21 implies that the necessary discrimination cannot be achieved through classification on the basis of 22 signals alone. This also shows that this data is non-trivial to classify and adds value to the results 23 produced for both the SOM and DCA. 
